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Apr s Apprendi

I. Federal Defendants
A. Raising Apprendi on Direct Appeal
1. Properly Preserved Claims-Harmless Error
(a) Failure to Instruct Trial Jury or
Prove Beyond Reasonable Doubt
(b) Misunderstanding of Elements of
Crime at Plea Proceeding
(c) Failure to Include Element in Indictment
2. Untimely Claim on Appeal-Plain Error
(a) Failure to Submit Element to Jury or
Prove Beyond Reasonable Doubt
(b) Failure to Allege Element in Indictment.
B. Apprendi-related Claims and 28 U.S.C. § 2255
1. Retroactivity and Teague
(a) Apprendi as New Rule
(b)The Bousley Loophole
2. Successive Motions Under § 2255
3. Procedurally Defaulted Claims Under § 2255
C. Claims of Ineffective Assistance
D. Remedy for Apprendi Error:
Resentencing under the Guidelines
II. State Prisoners
A. Direct Appeal
B. Collateral Relief for State Prisoners
C. Remedy
Conclusion
Appendix A: Selected Federal Statutes Subject to
Apprendi Challenge
Appendix B: Selected State Criminal Statutes Subject
to Apprendi Challenge
After Apprendi v. New Jersey,' any fact, other than a prior
conviction, that increases the penalty for an offense
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. This due process rule is properly labeled "watershed",' as it is bound to change the course of criminal
litigation significantly, both in the near future and well
into the coming decades. In a forthcoming article,' we
attempt to answer at length some of the profound questions raised by the Apprendi case including constitutional oversight of legislative authority to define what is
a "crime," questions that will ripen over the years as
legislatures look for ways around the rule and litigants
test these legislative reactions. In this shorter essay, we
focus on a more immediate problem facing those laboring in the trenches of the criminal justice system: the
4
correction of flawed judgments after Apprendi.
Apprendi threatens thousands of completed criminal prosecutions under dozens of existing federal and
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state statutes. Appendices A and B collect many of
these provisions. Some are what we would call "addon" statutes resembling the hate crime law at issue in
Apprendi. Such "add-on" statutes impose a higher maximum for any offense (or for a large subset of crimes)
following proof at sentencing of a specified aggravating NANCY J. KING
fact. Statutes that add prison time to what would other- AND SUSAN R.
wise be a statutory maximum if a firearm was used, or KLEIN
if there was injury to a victim, or if the crime was committed while on pretrial release, are additional examNancy J. King, Profesples of "add-on" statutes that are subject to the Apprendi sor of Law and Associrule. Also at risk are convictions and sentences under
ate Dean for Research
what we would call "nested" statutes. "Nested" statutes and Faculty Developare those that include provisions that define a core
ment, Vanderbilt Unioffense, but peg higher sentence ceilings to the presversity Law School.
ence of aggravating facts as determined by the sentenc- nancy.king@law.vaning judge. The carjacking provision examined by the
derbilt.edu.
Court in Jones v. United States and the firearms offense
interpreted in United States v. Castillo6 are examples of
Susan R. Klein, Baker
such "nested" statutes, as are theft statutes that set the & Botts Professor of
sentence maximum using the sentencing judge's
Law, University of
determination of the value of the item stolen, and drug Texas at Austin.
statutes that boost maximum sentences for increasing sklein@mail.law.utexas
quantities of drugs.
.edu.
Whether relief is available to those sentenced
under these statutes depends in part upon whether the We thank Michael
Apprendi claim was raised on direct appeal or in a peti- Churgin, Jerold Israel,
tion for collateral relief, whether the failure to treat a
Douglas Laycock, Jorsentencing fact as an element was raised as a challenge dan Steiker, and
to the indictment, to jury instructions at trial, to the
George Thomas. We
validity of a guilty plea, or even as a claim of ineffective appreciate the research
assistance; and whether the claim was properly preassistance of Daniel
served by the defense. These different contexts are con- Reiss, Anthony Spaeth,
sidered separately, for federal and state defendants, in
and Nancy Pridgen.
the analysis that follows.
I. Federal Defendants
A huge proportion of federal prisoners today are serving sentences for violating 21 U.S.C. 841, prohibiting
the distribution of controlled substances. Their judgments are now open to challenge under Apprendi
because courts have for years assumed that although
S841(b) ties maximum sentences to the amount of
drugs involved, drug amount is a sentencing factor that
need not be charged in the indictment or proven to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.' The Supreme Court
has already remanded a case involving this provision to
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Apprendi,9 and the number of lower
court decisions evaluating the post-Apprendi claims of
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federal drug defendants increases weekly"o For prosecutors defending these sentences, we predict much litigation and resentencing, but relatively few released
defendants. Much, perhaps too much, will turn on the
pleading practices of various United States Attorneys
offices.
A. Raising Apprendi on Direct Appeal
Defendants who challenge their sentence under
Apprendi on direct appeal will encounter two major
road block: harmless error and plain error.

1. Properly Preserved Claims-Harmless Error
(a) Failure to Instruct TrialJury or Prove Beyond Reasonable Doubt. Consider first the defendant convicted by a
jury of violating \ 841, who alleges only the denial of a
jury determination of drug amount. Assume further
that this defendant raised his Apprendi claim in time by
demanding, albeit unsuccessfully, that drug quantity be
proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Conveniently, just before it announced its decision in Jones,
the Court held in Neder v. United States that omitting an
element of an offense from trial jury instructions can be
harmless error." Neder involved the failure of the trial
court to instruct the jury on the element of "materiality"
in a tax fraud charge. Five justices decided that the evidence of this element was "overwhelming" and "uncontested," and therefore the omission of this element in
the charge to the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2 Justice Stevens concurred, but concluded
that the error was harmless because the jury's verdict
"necessarily included a finding" that the element
existed." Based on the assumption that none of the five
justices in the Neder majority will shift their votes in the
future and join Justice Stevens' more confined standard,'" it is inevitable that some defendants denied due
process under Apprendi will find their route to relief
blocked by the harmless error doctrine embraced in
Neder. Our federal drug offender, for example, is out of
luck if the record shows that "overwhelming" proof of
drug type and amount was introduced at trial, and was
not contested at the time."
(b) Misunderstandingof Elements of Crime at Plea Proceeding.The decision in Apprendi also provides ammunition for defendants who have been convicted
following a guilty plea. Like the defendant in Bousley v.
United States,'6 who attacked his plea-based conviction
after the Supreme Court in Bailey v. United States" unexpectedly decided that Bailey's firearm offense required
proof of active employment of the firearm, a defendant
convicted of violating 841 may be able to claim after
Apprendi that at the time he pleaded guilty, "neither he,
nor his counsel, nor the court correctly understood the
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essential elements of the crime with which he was
charged."'8 The defendant must show he was actually
misled by the court as to the elements of his offense,
but if he does, and his claim is timely, the plea is
invalid, requiring relief even if the prosecutor is able to
show that properly informed, the defendant would have
pleaded guilty anyway.'9
(c) Failure to Include Element in Indictment. The defendant sentenced under S 84i(b) whose indictment fails
to allege drug amount or type is in an even better position to obtain relief Unlike the trial context where the
omission of an element from jury instructions may be
harmless, the omission of an element from a federal
indictment is considered a constitutional violation not
subject to a finding of harmless error.- If Apprendi
means that maximum-boosting facts must be included
as elements in the indictment as well as proven to a
jury, prosecutors will be unable to use harmless error to
fend off an attack upon a judgment under 8 4 1(b) if the
indictment fails to allege the requisite drug amount.
The Court in Apprendi did not decide whether the
Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires
maximum-enhancing facts to be included as elements
in the indictment. Justice Stevens, noting that the issue
had not been raised, carefully declined to discuss
whether the grand jury indictment as well as the trial
jury instructions must include maximum enhancing
facts as elements." However, given the Court's earlier
dicta in Jones that it does," and the historical link
between the Apprendi rule and pleading practices,23 the
Court's affirmative answer to its open question seems
to be a foregone conclusion. Consequently, under prevailing doctrine, Apprendi error affecting the indictment
will warrant relief, even if the government later proved
the omitted element at trial, even if the defendant admitted the omitted element at a plea proceeding' 4 and, it
seems, even if the defendant expressly waived his right
to challenge his conviction or sentence.

2. Untimely Claim on Appeal - Plain Error
(a) Failureto Submit Element to Jury or Prove Beyond
Reasonable Doubt. Consider now the federal drug
offender whose indictment is sufficient, who objects on
appeal to the lack of jury finding on the element of drug
amount, but who did not raise this objection at trial.
Under FRCrP 52, an appellant who fails to raise his
claim on time can only obtain relief if he can demonstrate that his judgment was infected with "plain error."
This barrier to relief was extended recently by the Court
in Johnson v. United States to the omission of an element from jury instructions at trial." Instead, defendants aggrieved under Apprendi who are late in raising
their claim will receive no relief unless they can demon-
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strate a "miscarriage of justice" - no easy task, judging
from early retums.

7

(b)Failure to Allege Element in Indictment. Again, relief
for the defendant who protests a missing element from
the indictment will be more accessible than for the
defendant who objects to a different type of error, even
when that objection is untimely. For just as the failure
to allege an essential element is never considered harmless when a defendant raises the issue properly before
trial, a defendant's belated claim after conviction that his
indictment failed to allege an essential element is also
exempt from the usual plain error rules. 8
We anticipate that before long, the pressure to
extend more rigorous harmless error and plain error
review to missing-allegation cases will intensify. Since
Neder, one finds in lower-court opinions repeated
expressions of frustration with the rule of automatic
reversal for missing elements/s Indeed, there is a real
possibility that Apprendi will prompt both the Court and
Congress to reconsider their respective automatic reversal rules for missing elements in a federal indictment,
especially in light of several decisions undermining the
grand jury's screening function.,' For brevity's sake, we
do not pursue these issues here, except to note that
since its decision to apply harmless error analysis to
constitutional error in Chapman v. California,' the
Court has yet to revisit directly the application of harmless error or plain error review to the failure to allege an
essential element in a federal indictment; nor has the
Court considered the question in light of its recent decisions in Neder or Johnson extending harmless and plain
error review to the omission of an element from trial
jury instructions.
B. Apprendi-related Claims and 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Federal defendants who have completed their direct
appeals must seek relief for Apprendi error through 28
U.S.C. \ 2255. Many federal convictions and sentences
that fall under Apprendi's shadow will be sheltered by
the rules limiting collateral relief

1. Retroactivity and Teague
(a) Apprendi as New Rule. One formidable barrier to
relief for Apprendi error under 5 2255 is Teague v. Lane"2
which bars retroactive application of "new rules" of procedure unless the rule meets one of two narrow exceptions. That Apprendi is a "new" rule under Teague, not
"dictated" by prior precedent, is amply illustrated by the
debate between the justices about its consistency with
prior decisions. We believe the majority in Apprendi is
correct, and that the decision is quite consistent with
prior precedenty but one would be hard pressed to
maintain that "no other interpretation was reasonable."
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As for the Teague exceptions, the Apprendi rule
does not qualify as a rule that protects certain conduct
from punishment altogetherY Nor, in our view, does it
qualify for the second exception as a watershed ruling
central to an accurate determination of guilt that
"alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural
6
elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding."
However this is a closer question. On the one hand the
rule is fundamental in that it affects potentially any
criminal statute, involves the basic mechanisms of
adjudication (burden of proof and the jury), and affects
the accuracy of individual judgments. On the other
hand, the rule of Apprendi lacks the "primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in Gideon,'V for unlike deprivations of counsel, it does not protect the blameless
from punishment, but instead protects the unquestionably blameworthy from unauthorized amounts of punishment. The decision does no more to "alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements
essential to the fairness of the proceeding" than other
rules rejected under the exception, including the ruling
in Batson v.Kentucky. Indeed, the Court has yet to find
any ruling that qualifies for this exception, and it seems
unlikely to us that the Apprendi rule will be the first."
(b) The Bousley Loophole. The Court in Bousely v.United
States19 held that where an applicant for relief under
5 2255 seeks retroactive application of a new interpretation of substantive criminal law, rather than a new rule
of procedure, he need not worry about retroactivity and
Teague. Just as the petitioner in Bousley was not barred
by Teague from taking advantage of a new interpretation
of the weapons offense of which he was convicted,
defendants convicted of aggravated carjacking after
Jones or of the possession of particular weapons after
Castillomay seek retroactive application of the Court's
recent interpretations of these federal offenses. 4° Conceivably, by pointing to the first decision from his
neighborhood court of appeals finding as a matter of
statutory interpretation that the sentence-enhancing
fact in any given federal criminal statute is an element,
an applicant previously sentenced under that statute
who seeks relief under 5 2255 may, like Bousley, cast his
claim as one that seeks to apply a new interpretation of
substantive criminal law rather than one seeking
retroactive application of the procedural rule
announced in Apprendi.
2. Successive Motions under § 2255
Applicants who raise their Apprendi claims in a second
or successive 5 2255 motion will encounter a dead end.
Relief for such claims is available only if the court of
appeals will certify that the claim is based on "a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that was previously
unavailable."4' But no court of appeals can make such a
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done so at trial or on direct appeal. Making out the
required showing of "prejudice" will be the most common obstacle here,' just as harmless error and actual
innocence standards will derail many of the claims of
Apprendi error described above. Moreover, a defendant
convicted of violating S841 will not have an easy time
establishing that his attorney's conduct in failing to
anticipate Apprendi "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. "5, Before Apprendi, not a single Circuit
had agreed to characterize drug amount as an element
under S 841 rather than a sentencing factor, even after
the Court's decision in Jones."

certification unless and until the United States Supreme
Court decides that Apprendi should be applied retroactively, a decision we believe is unlikely to materialize.,'
But the review of claims in second or successive
2255 motions is restricted to claims based upon new
rules of constitutional law; there is no provision for the
review of claims based on new interpretations of federal
statutes. Consequently, a defendant whose second or
successive petition raises Jones or Castillo, both of
which were decided on statutory, not constitutional,
grounds, 43 must give up on 2255. He may resort
instead to bringing a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241
and argue that the remedy under j 2255 is inadequate
or ineffective, as have other defendants who ran into
the same problem when they belatedly sought S2255
relief claiming they were not guilty of "use" of a firearm
after the Court attributed a new meaning to that offense
in BaileT."

D. Remedy for Apprendi Error: Resentencing under
the Guidelines
Should an offender succeed in navigating these rules
and winning relief, that relief will probably be resentencing. Yet such resentencing may sometimes result
in the very same term of incarceration.
Typically, the defendant will be resentenced on a
lesser offense, each element of which was alleged and
proven in accordance with the Constitution. Retrial on
the more aggravated offense will be impractical in
many cases, and, in any event, may be barred by double
jeopardy. Under S 841, because the sentence ceilings
for the least quantity of drugs are already quite high,
even a successful Apprendi challenge may not reduce
time behind bars. 55
The case of United States v.Aguayo-Delgado6 will
illustrate. The defendant, prior to Apprendi, was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in
violation of S846. At sentencing the judge determined
that the defendant had distributed over 3 but less than
15 kilograms of methamphetamine, which mandated a
base offense level of 36 under the Sentencing Guidelines. The combination of his base offense level and
criminal history category yielded a sentencing range of
235-293 months.57 The judge imposed a sentence of
240 months. Following Apprendi, the defendant
appealed his conviction and sentence, and demonstrated that his indictment failed to include an allegation of the amount of methamphetamine. The Circuit
court refused to remand, because the trial judge on
resentencing would use the exact same Guidelines calculations, and reach the same result. It was true that
after Apprendi the judge cannot sentence above the
statutory maximum for the highest offense alleged in
the indictment and found by the jury, which for AguayoDelgado was up to 30 years under 21 S8 4 i(b)(i) (C) for
delivery of any amount of methamphetamine (rather
than life imprisonment, the sentence maximum provided by S8 4 I(b)(i)(A) for 5o grams or more of
methamphetamine). However, 240 month sentence
originally imposed did not exceed that 30 year cap.
Aguayo-Delgado might argue that a different calculation under the Guidelines should apply on resentenc-

3. Procedurally Defaulted Claims Under § 2255
Even if not blocked by retroactivity rules, or rules limiting claims raised in second or successive motions,
applicants who did not raise their claims early
52255
enough must demonstrate cause for and prejudice from
their failure to protest on time, or, alternatively, their
actual innocence. 4 Here again, courts will turn to Bousley for guidance, where the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the novelty of the claim endorsed
by the Court in its Bailey decision provided "cause" for
his default. The Court concluded, with very little explanation, that the legal basis for Bousley's claim was reasonably available at the time (noting "the Federal
Reporters were replete with cases involving" similar
46
claims), so that novelty as cause was unavailable. Nor
did the Court accept the defendant's argument that raising the claim earlier would have been futile: "futility
cannot constitute cause if it means simply that a claim
was unacceptable to that particular court at that particular time.",, Similar conclusions concerning "cause" can
be expected in the context of Apprendi challenges to
4
convictions and sentences under 841. 1
That leaves our offender with the defaulted claim
only the alternative of showing actual innocence. For a
violator ofS 841, this means showing that the more serious drug amount or type that should have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury probably did not
exist.49 Further, if the conviction is the result of a plea
bargain, as Bousely's was, the defendant must show in
addition, that he is innocent of any more serious charge
which had been dismissed as part of his plea bargain.
For many federal prisoners, either showing will raise
insurmountable burdens."
C. Claims of Ineffective Assistance
Rather than raise an Apprendi-relatedclaim directly, a
defendant may allege that his attorney should have
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ing, one using offense level 12 (the lowest for any
amount of methamphetamine), which would produce a
recommended range of io-i6 months?8 But nothing in
Apprendi precludes the government from using a fact
that is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to set a
sentence within the statutory maximum.19
Sometimes, however, a significant sentence reduction will be warranted.6' For example, in the unlikely
event that drug type as well as amount is missing from
an indictment, then the court upon resentencing an
offender convicted under \ 841 must assume that the
offense of conviction involved the minimal amount of
that controlled substance punished least severely marijuana. Thus, the statutory maximum would drop
to one year under S841 (b)(4 ), the only offense validly
pled and proven.6 ' In the more likely event that drug
type was charged in the indictment but drug quantity
not submitted to the jury, a steep sentence may be
saved by proof of a prior conviction at the new sentencing hearing. 21 U.S.C. S8 4 i(b)(C) authorizes raising the
statutory maximum sentence for any amount of schedule I or II substances from 20 to 30 years if the defendant has a prior felony drug conviction. And, under
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), sentences may
be enhanced by a judge beyond the statutory maximum
based upon the fact of prior convictions, without charging those convictions in the indictment or submitting
then to a jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.6"
II. State Prisoners
A. Direct Appeal
State offenders who raise Apprendi as a basis for attacking their sentences and convictions face similar hurdles, for most of them will encounter rules for harmless
and plain error on direct appeal that are very like those
in the federal system." However, some states offer
more generous review for an aggrieved prisoner, having
rejected Neder and/orJohnson," while other states
extend even less relief for delinquent claims than is provided by federal law. In particular, the Grand Jury
Clause does not bind the states, and the failure to allege
an essential element in the charge is not a fatal error in
many states. 65 Nevertheless, some states consider the
failure to allege an essential element in the charge a
"jurisdictional error" that, like the failure to plead an
essential element in a federal indictment, can be raised
at any time.6 6

FEDERAL SENTENCING

B. Collateral Relief for State Prisoners
State post-conviction relief may be available for
Apprendi error.6" Significantly, however, the 1996
amendments to the federal habeas statute effectively
block federal habeas corpus relief for state prisoners
who seek relief from the rejection by state courts of
Apprendi-like arguments made prior to the date
Apprendi was handed down. 8 These prisoners will not
be able to show that a state court's failure to treat a maximum-enhancer as an element was "contrary to...
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,"6 because
70
Apprendi was a case of first impression for the Court.
Nor would a state prisoner be able to argue that a state
court's failure to anticipate Apprendi was an "unreasonable application" of prior precedent, even after Jones,
given that four dissenting justices in Apprendi thought
prior precedent compelled a different rule. 7' Following
the announcement of the Apprendi decision, however,
state court decisions that fail to heed Apprendi in resolving what must be treated as an element will be subject
to collateral review in federal court.
C. Remedy
As in the federal system, state prisoners who do succeed in mounting a challenge based on Apprendi will
probably obtain resentencing rather than dismissal and
retrial.7 As the sentence ceilings provided by the states
for drug offenses tend not to be as high as those for federal drug offenses, resentencing may in some cases produce a sentence much lower that the original
73
sentence.
Conclusion
A considerable quantity of criminal justice resources
will be spent sorting out the proper punishment for
state and federal prisoners who were convicted by the
time the Court announced its decision in Apprendi.
Eventually, however, the number of pre-Apprendi convictions will dwindle to a trickle and this correction
process will have run its course. The more lasting
impact of the decision, we believe, will be its effect on
legislative efforts to draft crimes and punishments in its
wake, and its implications for constitutional limits on
the shape of substantive criminal law.
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Appendix A. Selected Federal Statutes Subject to Apprendi Challenge

Statute

Maximum enhancing feature(s)

18 U.S.C. § 13

Increasing maximum sentence by
one year where minor in vehicle.

(drunk driving on military base or
federal lands)

Challenged in:

18 U.S.C. § 34
(penalty when death results)

Increasing maximum sentence to
death penalty based upon crime
resulting in death.

18 U.S.C. § 43(b)
(aggravated offense, animal enterprise
terrorism)

Increasing maximum sentence from
1 year to life imprisonment based upon
finding of bodily injury or death.

18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2)
(assaulting federal officer)

Increasing maximum sentence from 1 to
3 years based upon seriousness of assault.

United States v. Nuihez, 180
F3d 227 (5th Cir. 1999).

18 U.S.C. § 111(b)
(use of a weapon in assault of federal
officer)

Increasing maximum sentence from 3 to
10 years based upon use of a deadly
weapon or infliction of bodily injury.

United States v. Chestaro,
197 F3d 600 (2nd Cir.
1999).

18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)
(bribery)

Increasing fine to three times the monetary
equivalent of the thing of value.

18 U.S.C. § 216
(penalty and injunctions)

Increasing maximum sentence from
1 to 5 years if violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 203-205 or §§ 207-209 (bribery and
gratuity) occurs willfully.

18 U.S.C. § 247
(damage to religious property)

Increasing maximum sentence from
1 year to death penalty based upon
finding of bodily injury or death.

18 U.S.C. § 248 (b)
(penalties for violation of freedom of
access to clinic entrances act)

Increasing maximum sentence from
3 to 10 years or life imprisonment based
upon serious bodily injury or death.

18 U.S.C. § 521
(criminal street gang statute)

Increasing maximum sentence by additional
10 years if federal felony offense was
committed while participating in or to
promote a criminal street gang.

18 U.S.C. § 653
(misuse of public funds)

Increasing fine to amount embezzled.

18 U.S.C. § 659
(interstate or foreign shipments
by carrier)

Decreasing maximum sentence from
10 to 1 year based upon value of goods
stolen not exceeding $10,000.

18 U.S.C. § 661
(theft within special maritime jurisdiction)

Increasing maximum sentence from
1 to 5 years based upon value of property.

18 U.S.C. § 893
(extortionate extensions of credit)

Increasing fine to twice the value of the
money or property so advanced.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988 ed. Supp. V)
(use of firearm in relation to crime of
violence or drug trafficking)

Increasing maximum sentence by
additional 5 to 30 years based upon
type and use of firearm.

Castillo v. United States,
530 U.S.-(2000) (Congress
intended the statutory
references to particular
firearm types to define
separate crimes).

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (A) (Sup. IV 1998)
(enhanced penalties for use of weapon
in relation to crime of violence or drug
trafficking)

Increasing maximum sentence by an
additional 5 to 10 years based upon
brandishing or discharging weapon.

United States v. Carlson,
2000 WL 924593 (8th
Cir 2000).
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Oral argument in
United States v. Jones,
1998 WL 713483 (1999).

2000

United States v. Matthews,
178 F3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 120 S.Ct. 359
(1999).

United States v. Galvez,
2000 WL 1140343
(S.D. Fla. 2000).

Appendix A (continued). Selected Federal Statutes Subject to Apprendi Challenge
Statute

Maximum enhancing feature(s)

Challenged in:

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)
(Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984)

Providing a mandatory minimum of 15 years
and no specified maximum sentence for
violating 922(g) after three previous convictions.

United States v. Mack,
2000 WL 1456245
(3rd Cir.).

18 U.S.C. § 924(j)
(causing death of a person in the
course of a violation of subsection c)

Increasing maximum sentence by additional
5 years to death sentence based upon a
murder.

United States v. PefiaGonzalez, 62 FSupp. 2d
366 (D. Puerto Rico 1999).

18 U.S.C. § 982 (criminal forfeitures)

Authorizing property forfeiture in addition to
maximum penalty for violation of money
laundering or bank secrecy act based on
offense involving property or generating proceeds.

18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)
(penalty for fraud in connection with computers)

Increasing maximum sentence from 1 to 5
years based upon value of information.

18 U.S.C. § 1033
(crimes by or affecting persons engaged
in the business of insurance)

Increasing maximum sentence from
10 to 15 years based upon jeopardizing
the soundness of an insurer.

18 U.S.C. § 1091(b)
(punishment for genocide)

Increasing maximum sentence from 20 years
to death penalty based upon resulting death.

18 U.S.C. § 1201
(death during kidnapping)

Increasing maximum sentence from life
imprisonment to death penalty based upon
death of victim.

18 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii)
(alien smuggling)

Increasing maximum sentence to ten years if
smuggling was for commercial advantage or gain.

18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343
(mail and wire fraud)

Increasing maximum sentence from 5 to 30
years based upon violation affecting a
financial institution.

United States v. Brown,
1999 WL 1068273 (D.
Me. 1999).

18 U.S.C. § 1363
(buildings or property within special
maritime jurisdiction)

Increasing maximum sentence from 5 to 20
years based upon the building being a
dwelling or a life being placed in jeopardy.

18 U.S.C. § 1503(b)
(punishment for influencing juror)

Increasing maximum penalty from 10 years
to death penalty based upon killing.

18 U.S.C. § 1791(b)
(federal inmates possessing prohibited object)

Increasing maximum sentence from 6 months
to 20 years based upon nature of prohibited
object.

United States v. Allen,
190 F3d 1208 (11th
Cir. 1999).

18 U.S.C. § 1959
(violent crime in aid of
racketeering activities)

Increasing maximum penalty from 3 years to
death penalty based upon use of weapon,
injury to victim, death of victim.

United States v. Kee,
2000 WL 863119
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).

18 U.S.C. 1963(a)(3)
(criminal RICO forfeiture)

Mandating forfeiture of proceeds derived
from or proceeds of racketeering activity.

United States v. Corrado,
2000 WL 1396742 (6th
Cir. 2000).

18 U.S.C. §§ 2261(A) (interstate stalking),
2261 (interstate domestic violence)

Increasing maximum sentence from
5 years to life based on injury to victim.

United States v. Brown, 1999
WL 1068273 (D. Me. 1999).

18 U.S.C. § 2262(b)
(penalties for interstate violation
of protective order)

Increase sentence from 5 to 10 years if serious
bodily injury to the victims result,20 years if
permanent disfigurement results, or life
imprisonment if the victim dies.

18 U.S.C. § 2326
(enhanced penalties for fraud)

Increasing maximum fraud sentence by
additional 5 years based upon telemarketing,
and additional 10 years based upon 1141096
victimizing at least 10 persons over age 55.
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United States v. Terence
Earl Davis, 202 F3d 212
(4th Cir. 2000)

United States v. Pavelcik,
2000 WL (9th Cir.2000)
(unpublished).
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Appendix A (continued). Selected Federal Statutes Subject to Apprendi Challenge
Maximum enhancing feature(s)

18 U.S.C. § 2332(b)(c)

Increasing maximum sentence from 10 to 25
years based on damage to property, 30 years
based on serious bodily injury, 35 years for
maiming, life imprisonment for kidnapping,
and the death sentence for killing.

(penalties for acts of terrorism
transcending national boundaries)

18 U.S.C. § 2701(b)
(punishment for violation of video
piracy protection act)

Increasing sentence from 6 months to 1 year
based upon purpose of commercial advantage.
Increasing maximum sentence by
additional I to 10 years for commission
of an offense while on release.

United States v. Davis,
114 F3d 400 (2nd Cir.
1997).

18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3)(A)
(federal three-strikes law)

Increasing maximum sentence for a serious
violent felony to mandatory life imprisonment
based upon recidivism, with exceptions for
certain kinds of robberies.

United States v. Kaluna,
192 F3d 1188 (9th Cir.
1999).

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (B) and (C)
(manufacture or possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute)

Increasing maximum sentence from 20 years
to life based upon quantity of Schedule I or II
substance or resulting injury or death.

Jones v. United States, 194
F23 1178 (10th Cir. 1999),
cert. granted, vacated and
remanded, No. 99-8176
(6/29/00); United States v.
Rebmann, 2000 WL
1209271 (6th Cir. 2000).

Increasing maximum sentence from 1 to 5
years based upon quantity of marijuana.

United States v. Kelly,
2000 WL 103972 (S.D.
Cal. 2000).

18 U.S.C. § 3147
(penalty for offense committed
while on release)

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D)
(manufacture or possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute)
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(7)
(penalties for distribution)

Increasing maximum sentence from
I to 20 years based upon commission
of crime of violence during drug offense.

21 U.S.C. § 843(d)
(penalties for prohibited acts C)

Increasing maximum sentence from 4 to 10
years based upon intent to manufacture
methamphetamine.

21 U.S.C. § 844(a)
(penalties for simple possession)

21 U.S.C. § 846
(attempt and conspiracy to distribute
controlled substances)

338

Challenged in:

Statute

Increasing maximum sentence from I to 20
years based upon the substance containing
cocaine base, from 1 year to 3 years based
upon possession of flunitrazepam.
Authorizing same enhancements as under
21 U.S.C. § 841(b).

21 U.S.C. § 848(e)
(death penalty for violation of continuing
criminal enterprise)

Increasing maximum sentence from life
imprisonment to death penalty based upon
an intentional killing.

21 U.S.C. § 853
(criminal forfeitures)

Authorizing property forfeiture in addition to
maximum sentence based on property being
used in or derived from a drug offense.

21 U.S.C. § 859
(distribution to persons under age 21)

Authorizing twice the maximum sentence for
violation of § 841(b), based upon distribution
to a person under 21 years of age.

21 U.S.C. § 860
(distribution near schools)

Authorizing twice the maximum sentence
available for violation of § 841(b) based
upon distributing within 1,000 ft. of a school.

31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(b), 5324
(criminal penalties for violation
of bank secrecy act)

Increasing maximum sentence from 5 to 10
years based upon violating the bank secrecy
act while violating another law or as part of a
pattern of illegal activity.
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United States v. Porter,
1999WL 1116812 (1Oth
Cir.1999); United States
v. Aguayo-Delgado, 2000
WL 988128 (8th Cir. 2000).

Appendix B. Selected State Criminal Statutes Subject to Apprendi Challenge
"Nested" Statutes Which Allow Judge to Raise the Penalty within a Certain Type of Crime.
Statute

Maximum enhancing feature

Interpreted in:

Ga. Stat. § 16-8-12 (Georgia) (1933)

Increasing offense from misdemeanor to 10
year felony if theft exceeded $500; to15 year
sentence if defendant is fiduciary or public
employee.

State v. Forthe, 514
S.E.2d 890 (Ga.Ct.App.
1999); Hight v. State,
472 S.E.2d 113
(Ga.Ct.App. 1996).

27 MD Code § 342 (Maryland) (1977)

Increasing offense from misdemeanor to
15 year felony if theft exceeded $300.

State v. Stackowitz, 511
A.2d 1105 (Maryland
1986); Proctorv. State,
435 A.2d 484
(Maryland 1981).

Increasing sentence from 10 to 25 years
based upon quantity.

Cleveland v. State, 463
S.E.2d 36 (Ga. App. 1995).

1. Theft Statutes

2. Controlled Substance Statutes
Ga. Stat. § 16-13-31 (Georgia) (1989)

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31.22
(New Mexico) (1980)

Increasing sentence from 18 months to 3
years if more than 100 lbs. of marijuana.

N.D. Stat. § 19-03.1-23.1
(North Dakota) (1989)

Raises penalty to next highest
class of felony.

State v. Allesi, 216
N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1974).

18 Pa. Consol. Stats. § 780-113(f)(1.1)
(Pennsylvania) (1978)

Increasing maximum sentence from 5 to
10 years.

Commonwealth v. Myers,
722 A.2d 649 (1998).

Statutes Which Allow Judge to Raise the Penalty for All Crimes.
1. "While on Release" Statutes
DC Code § 23-1328 (D.C.) (1970)

Additional 1-5 years if felony, 90-180 days
if misdemeanor.

Speight v. United States,
569 A.2d 124 (D.C.App.
1989) (en banc).

ARS § 13-604.02A (Arizona) (1993)

Court may increase statutory maximum by up
to 25% if it finds two "substantial aggravating
factors."

State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz.
124(1987); State v. Powers,
154 Ariz. 291 (1987).

CTS § 53a-40b (Connecticut) (1990)

Adds 10 years to offense if felony, adds 1 year
if misdemeanor.

NHSA § 597:14-b (New Hampshire)
(1988)

Adds up to 7 years to sentence if felony
offense, 1 year if misdemeanor.

RIGL § 12-13-1.2
(Rhode Island) (1985)

Additional 2-10 years if felony, 90-365 days
if misdemeanor.

2. Firearms Statutes
Cal. Penal Code §§ 12022 et. al.

State v. Ringuette,
697 A.2d 507 (1997).

Additional 1-10 years for felony if weapon
used.

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 (Indiana)
(1987)

Raises voluntary manslaughter
to higher class of felony.

KRS § 218A.992 (Kentucky) (1994)

Controlled substance offenses raised
to higher class of felony.

Adams v. Commonwealth,
931 S.W.2d 465
(Ky.Ct.App. 1996).

17-A M.R.S.A. § 401 (Maine) (1977)

Burglary offenses raised to
higher class of felony.

State v. DeWalt, 684
R2d1291 (Maine 1996).

NJSA § 2C:39-4.1 (New Jersey) (1998)

Controlled substance offenses raised.
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Notes
120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000).
120 S. Ct. at 2394 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Nancy J. King and Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VANDERBILT LAW REV. -(forthcoming
0

2001).

Since Professor Klein was quoted in the Washington Post,
July 23, 2000, as opining that Apprendi was "going to be a
disaster," she and Professor King have been inundated with
hundreds of calls from members of the press, Assistant
United States Attorneys, District Attorneys, criminal defense
attorneys, judges, and criminal defendants regarding
whether previously imposed sentences under statutes challengeable under Apprendi are now subject to attack.
526 U.S. 227 (1999).

6 530 U.S.

- (2000).

Overall, 58.9% of the total federal prison population in 1998
were incarcerated for drug- related offenses. USDOJ, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1998. The average sentence for a federal drug offender in 1990 was 84 months.
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress:
Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 138 & nn. 186-188
(February 1995). Altogether, some 400,000 federal, state,
and local inmates-almost a quarter of the overall inmate
population-are serving time or awaiting trial for drug
offenses. Justice on Trial 23, Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights and Education Fund, 2000, http://www.civilrights.org
/policy and legislation/pI issues/criminal justice/; Allen J.
Beck, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin 1, USDOJ, Office of
Justice Programs (April 2000) http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
(discussing inmate population).
Following Jones but prior to Apprendi, lower courts continued
to deny relief to defendants claiming that drug amount in a
§ 841 prosecution was an element not a sentencing factor.
See, e.g., United States v. Twitty, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12225
(4th Cir. May 23, 2000) (collecting cases).
See Carless Jones v. United States, No. 99-8176, 6/29/00,
certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded in
light of Apprendi v. New Jersey. The Tenth Circuit had held
that the Court's earlier Jones opinion did not require that 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which provides for a maximum penalty
of life imprisonment based upon a finding of 50 grams or
more of cocaine base, be considered an element of an
offense rather than a sentencing enhancer. 194 F3d 1178,
1183-1186 (10th Cir. 1999). But see United States v. Kelly,
105 E Supp. 2d 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (indictment need not
allege 9 kilograms of marijuana as element of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) offense, as drug amount does not "increase" the
statutory maximum sentence, but "determines" it).
0 Well over 100 lower court cases have discussed Apprendi in
the few months since the decision was handed down.
"See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1999).
12527 U.S. at 18 ("where an omitted element is supported by
uncontroverted evidence, this approach reaches an appropriate balance between 'society's interest in punishing the guilty
[and] the method by which decisions of guilt are made' ").
'3 See Neder, 527 U.S. at 27 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented,
arguing that the Court's decision meant that the remedy for
the constitutional violation is a repetition of the same violation by a different judge. 527 U.S. at 30-40.
'" There is reason to believe this shift might occur. The five-justice majority in Apprendi defending the importance of jury
review of each and every element consisted of the three dissenters in Neder plus Justices Thomas and Stevens. When
the harmlessness of Apprendi error eventually reaches the
Court, Justice Thomas may renounce his decision in Neder
and conclude either that such error is never harmless, or that
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Justice Steven's position is more consistent with Apprendi.
(Recall that in Apprendi he renounced his vote in AlmendarezTorres).
Harmlessness under Neder requires at the least proof before
a trial jury; even uncontested and irrefutable evidence of the
missing element will not suffice if the jury never hears it.
For recent cases applying Neder to jury instructions omitting
elements, compare, e.g., United States v. Sheppard, 219 F3d
766 (8th Cir. 2000) (failure to instruct jury that drug quantity
is an element of 21 U.S.C. § 841 was harmless because the
indictment charged the defendant with conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, and the jury
made a special finding of that quantity); People v. Marshall,
99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2000) (failure to
instruct the jury that the firearm must have proximately
caused the death and the decedent, before imposing additional 25-year sentencing enhancement, was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt as defendant repeatedly shot
decedent who was supine upon the ground); United States v.
Joubert, 2000 WL 1155012 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished)
(where defendant raised issue of Apprendi error for first time
at oral argument on direct appeal, court found error harmless as the sentence he received for quantity of crack cocaine
was below the statutory maximum sentence for distribution
of powder cocaine); Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F3d
8 (1st Cir. 2000) (failure to submit issue of serious bodily
injury during carjacking, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2),
was harmless error, as jury heard uncontroverted evidence
that the defendant shot his victim, and that his victim ultimately lost a limb); United States v. Davis, 202 F3d 212, 217
(4th Cir. 2000) (holding that failure to instruct jury on the
aggravating facts of "destructive conduct directed at a
dwelling" and "placing lives in danger," was harmless when
those facts were "uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence"); People v. Geisendorfer, 991 R2d 308, 312
(Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that failure to instruct jury that
fear of serious bodily harm experienced by the victims must
be "imminent" was harmless when no reasonable jury could
have determined that the victims' fear was of anything other
than imminent serious bodily harm); with United States v.
Brown, 202 F3d 691, 703 (4th Cir. 2000) (failure to instruct
jury regarding separate element under Richardson not harmless when defendant "genuinely contested" evidence); Keating v. Hood, 191 F3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999)
(instructions omitting the element of mens rea, and thus
allowing defendant to be convicted of securities fraud as
either a direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor, not harmless); People v. Peoples, No. 98CA2486, 2000 Colo. App.
LEXIS 838, at *4 (Colo. App. 2000) (omitting from jury
instructions element that dwelling was that of "another" in a
trespass case was not harmless when defendant contested
missing element "vigorously" at trial and presented conflicting witness testimony).
523 U.S. 614 (1998).
" 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
'8 523 U.S. at 618-19.
Id. But see United States v. Rebmann, 226 F3d 521 (6th Cir.
2000) (where defendant pleaded guilty to heroin distribution
understanding that if the court found that death resulted
from the distribution she could be sentenced to a life term
rather than the statutory maximum of 20 years, court
vacated 292 month sentence based upon a judicial finding
by a preponderance of the evidence and remanded for court
determination of this element beyond a reasonable doubt).
See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962). See also LaFave,
Israel & King, 4 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE at § 19.2(d) and (e)
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and § 19.3(a) (West, 2d ed. 1999). We do not believe that
this analysis would change had the prosecutor filed a bill of
particulars. But see United States v. Braugh, 204 F3d 177
(5th Cir. 2000) (indictment that omits essential element of
offense sufficient under Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury
Clause because it alleged facts from which grand jury could
have inferred missing element, relying on Neder), petition for
cert. filed 6/20/00, Brauch v. United States, 99-2049.
Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2355-56 n.3.
22 526 U.S. at 243, n. 6 ("under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction)
that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt") (emphasis added).
23 In addition to the extensive historical review
in the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in Apprendi, we review this
historical background at length in our forthcoming article.
See King & Klein, supra note 3.
21 That a defendant admitted the existence
of a missing element as part of a guilty plea, or that a trial jury concluded
the fact existed after a fair trial is "'irrelevant."' United States
v. Du Bo, 186 F3d 1177, 1180 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (vacating
conviction when mens rea omitted from indictment). See,
e.g., United States v. Keith, 605 F2d 462 (9th Cir. 1979)
(relief despite proof at trial); United States v. Cabrera Teran,
168 E3d 141 (5th Cir. 1999) (relief despite plea); United
States v. Prentiss, 206 F3d 960, 977 (10th Cir. 2000) (vacating conviction of charge of arson when indictment failed to
allege elements of Indian status of defendant and victim,
despite guilty verdict by jury, defense stipulation to missing
elements, and failure of defendant to contest existence of
elements, noting that "applying harmless error analysis to
the total omission of an essential element would allow the
prosecution to circumvent the grand jury proceeding" and
collecting similar cases); United States v. Spinner, 180 F3d
514, 516 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that failure to allege element of "interstate commerce" in indictment was "fatal"
and thus vacating conviction, following guilty plea).
Lower courts have already applied the automatic reversal
rule for insufficient indictments in several carjacking cases
post-Jones. See, e.g., United States v. Rudisill, No. 99-4588,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10380, at -3-4 (4th Cir. May 15,
2000) (vacating guilty plea because indictment failed to
allege element of "serious bodily injury," noting that it is
"error for the district court to sentence a defendant where
an indictment fails to allege an essential element of the
offense and the district court fails to include the element
when advising the defendant of the elements of the crime
with which he is charged); United States v. Arnett, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27415 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that because
"the serious bodily injury element of § 2119(2) was not
included in the indictment and was not presented to the jury
...we must vacate Arnett's sentence for carjacking under
§ 2119(2) and remand ... for resentencing under § 2119
(1)"); United States v. Matthews, 178 F3d 295 ( 5th Cir.
1999) (same); United States v. Davis, 184 F.3d 366 (4th Cir.
1999) (same).
25 The waiver of appellate rights as part of a plea or sentence
agreement is increasingly popular in the federal system, and
has proved to be a powerful weapon for prosecutors. See
Nancy J. King, Priceless Process, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1999)
(discussing appeal waivers). But several courts have held
that even an express waiver does not prohibit a defendant
from appealing a sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum for the crime of conviction, and Apprendi
error, by definition, involves precisely this situation. At least

FEDERAL

SENTENCING

one court has allowed defendants to raise Jones error on
appeal, despite an express waiver of the right to appeal. See
United States v. Rudisill, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10380 (4th
Cir. May 15 2000) (finding that defendant's waiver of appeal
did not prevent him from challenging his carjacking sentence under Jones on appeal). See also Latorre v. United
States, 193 F2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1999) (questioning validity of
collateral attack waivers in dicta).
26 520 U.S. 461, 470 (1997).
21 See United States v. Perez-Montanez,
202 F3d 434 (1st Cir.
2000) (Jones error raised for the first time on appeal, noting
that because the indictment specifically referred to the
statutory section of the carjacking statute specifying the
enhanced sentence if death results, the defendant's claim
was limited to objecting to the failure to instruct the jury on
those elements at trial, which, after review under plain error
standards, produced neither prejudice nor miscarriage of
justice, citing Johnson); United States v. Wigging, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 30695 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding failure to charge
trial jury about the sentence maximum enhancing fact (a
shotgun) was not plain error, citing Johnson and noting that
evidence defendant used a short-barrelled shotgun was
"overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted");
United
States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F3d 292 (1st Cir. 2000) (Castillo
error raised for first time on appeal, review under plain error
standard failed to establish that omitted element "affected
substantial rights" as there was overwhelming evidence that
defendants used a semiautomatic assault weapon, and
failed to establish any miscarriage of justice); United States
v. Smith, 2000 WL 1144602 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished)
(finding no plain error because the defendant received sentences that did not exceed the statutory maximums set out
in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)); United States v. Garcia-Guizar,
227 F3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2000) (no plain error under Johnson
in failing to submit amount of drugs to jury because sentence of 168 months well within the 20 year prescribed
statutory maximum, and resentencing under Guidelines
would result in same sentence); United States v. Moore, 2000
WL 1339497 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Wright,
2000 WL 1283053 (4th Cir. 2000) (same). But see United
States v. Von Meshack, 200 WL 1218437 (5th Cir. 2000) (two
life sentences for conspiracy to possess crack cocaine with
intent to distribute and possession of crack cocaine vacated
for plain error where unenhanced maximum sentence would
have been 30 years); United States v. Nordby, 225 F3d 1053
(9th Cir. 2000) (where indictment alleged 2308 marijuana
plants, this amount was hotly contested at trial and sentencing, and the jury was instructed to find only "detectable
amount," imposition of enhanced 10-year sentence rather
than otherwise applicable five year sentence was "plain
error" that affected "substantial rights" and seriously
affected the fairness of the judicial proceeding); United
States v. Lewis, 2000 WL 1390065 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (where indictment alleged conspiracy to distribute
marijuana and cocaine, and general jury verdict did not
specify which of the controlled substances was the object of
the conspiracy, plain error affected substantial rights of the
defendant and the fairness of the judicial proceeding, as
defendant received 121 month sentence based upon cocaine
when the statutory maximum for marijuana was five years).
See, e.g., United States v. Prentiss, 206 F3d 960, 966 (1Oth
Cir. 2000) (vacating conviction where indictment failed to
include an element of the crime charged, as such omission
is a "fundamental jurisdictional defect that is not subject to
harmless error analysis"); United States v. Henderson, 105 F
Supp.2d 523 (S.D. W.Va. 2000) (failure to allege specific
drug amount in indictment limits punishment to the lowest
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statutory range provided by the statute, thus trial judge was
limited to maximum 240-month sentence as provided in 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), rather than the maximum of life
imprisonment provided by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)); 4
LaFave, Israel & King, supra note 20, at § 19.3(e) (discussing
FRCrP 12(b)(2) and citing authority finding that omission of
an element is always "plain error" to be noticed by the court
29

sua sponte).
See, e.g., United States v. Prentiss, 206 F3d 960, 978-79
(10th Cir. 2000) (Baldock, C.J., dissenting) ("a defendant's
right to have a jury find each element of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt is no less important than a defendant's right to have each element of the same offense presented to the grand jury ... illogically, denial of the former
right is subject to harmless error analysis, but denial of the
latter right is not"). Some courts have already extended plain
error review to missing-allegation cases. See United States v.
Mojica-Baez, 229 F3d 292 (1st Cir. 2000) (denying relief for
error of omitting type of weapon in indictment where error
was harmless and not structural, citing Johnson and Neder);
United States v. Woodruff, 1999 WL 776213 (9th Cir. 1999)
(unpublished) (denying relief for error in omitting element
from indictment when claim not raised until oral argument
on appeal, noting no "miscarriage of justice" citing Johnson),
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2202 (2000); United States v. RiosQuintero, 204 E3d 214 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting claim that
drug amount is an element under § 841, and stating that
even if it was, it would not support a finding of plain error:
noting that the indictment was "filed with a Notice of
Enhancement that listed the relevant drug quantity," the
defendant "stipulated that the offense involved more than
one kilogram of heroin and that evidence was submitted to
the jury," suggesting that it might decide differently if the
indictment did not list quantity and the defendant contested
the amount at trial); United States v. Rebmann, 226 F.3d 521,
n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that indictment is "probably technically deficient" because it did not include enhancement for
fact of resulting death, but refusing to address the issue
because it was not raised by the parties); United States v.
Swatzie, 228 E3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2000) (no plain error relief
where government failed to allege quantity of cocaine in
indictment, despite increase in statutory maximum sentence
from 30 years to life imprisonment, because the government

gave defendant notice of the enhancement a week after the
indictment was filed).
30 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (exculpatory
evidence need not be presented to the grand jury); United
States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986) (challenge to indictment based upon prosecutor misconduct was rendered moot
by defendant's subsequent conviction at a fairly conducted
trial); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956)
(insufficient or even non-existent proof before the grand jury
is considered "cured" by a subsequent conviction by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt).
Another, albeit more remote, possibility is that the Court will
decide that the essential elements requirement is not mandated by the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
4 LaFave, Israel & King, supra note 20, at § 19.2(f) (arguing
that even the most plausible functional defense of the essential elements requirement - that it is needed to insure grand
jury screening- is questionable).
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
32 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See also Bousely v. United States, 523
U.S. 614 (1998) (considering the application of Teague in
proceeding under § 2255).
3 See also King & Klein, supra note 5 (discussing Apprendi and
prior precedent).

FEDERAL

SENTENCING

REPORTER

• VOL.

12,

See Lambrix v. Singletary, 521 U.S. 151 (1997).
11See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,477 (1993).
11Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
37See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990).
See 5 LaFave, Israel & King, supra note 20, at § 28.6 (d)and
(e) (discussing Teague exceptions). But see United States v.
Murphy, 109 F.Supp.2d 1059 (D.Minn. 2000) (holding that
Apprendi error falls under second Teague exception and therefore is to be applied retroactively under § 2255).
39523 U.S. 614 (1998) (Bailey claim under § 2255 not barred
under Teague, because Teague bars only application of new
rules of procedure, not interpretations of substantive law)
,0Cf. United States v. Lanier, 205 F3d at 963 (Teague not applicable to claim of missing element under Richardson v. United
States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999), a case interpreting the federal
Continuing Criminal Enterprise offense to designate each
"violation" of the "series" as a separate element, an interpretation adopted in part to avoid problems with constitutionality under Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991)); Murr v.
United States, 200 F3d 895, 906 (6th Cir. 2000) (same).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Certification is also available if the claim is
based upon newly discovered evidence, but Apprendi claims
are typically apparent on the face of the record. See In re
Joshua, 224 F3d 1281 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (holding that even if
Apprendi is a new rule of constitutional law, it was not made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court), Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F3d 866 (7th Cir. 2000) (refusing to consider successive collateral attack on a sentence
until the Supreme Court declares Apprendi retroactive under
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(A), 2255 para.8(2)). But see West v.
Vaughn, 204 F3d 53, 59-63 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that
decision of the Supreme Court is "retroactive to cases on
collateral review" if its logic implies retroactivity under the
14

approach of Teague).
See discussion at notes 32-38, supra.
,1See Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000).
Id. (collecting such cases).
, See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621-23 (1998)
(Section 2255 relief from a plea-based conviction to the use
of a firearm preceding Court's Bailey decision that use of a
firearm requires active employment of the firearm requires a
showing of cause and prejudice or innocence because defendant's Bailey claim was untimely, finding no cause for failure
to raise objection to failure to charge element).
523 U.S. at 522 -23, distinguishing Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1
(1984).
, 523 U.S. at 623. See also Sustache-Rivera v. United States,
supra note 43.
" See United States v. Apker, 174 F3d 934 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting Bousley appears to have foreclosed a showing of cause
and prejudice for claimants challenging their convictions
based on subsequent interpretations of substantive criminal
law, and must instead prove actual innocence).
, See United States v. Villarreal Torres, 163 F3d 909 (5th Cir.
1999) (holding defendant alleging Bailey error can only overcome his procedural default if he demonstrates that "in light
of all the evidence ... it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him"); United States v.
Garth, 188 F3d 99 (3d Cir. 1999) (remanding for a hearing at
which defendant alleging Bailey error following plea-based
conviction can establish his actual innocence).
5 Latorre v. United States, 193 F3d 1035 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding in § 2255 challenge under Bailey, that "if, as part of the
plea agreement, the government withdrew more serous
charges, the defendant must demonstrate actual innocence
of those charges as well"). Judges presently disagree on
whether a "more serious" charge is measured by the statu-
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tory maximum, or by the recommended sentence under the
sentencing guidelines. Compare the majority opinion in
United States v. Halter, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15527 (8th Cir.
2000) (joining Third Circuit in holding that actual punishment rather than statutory maximum is the relevant factor in
comparing the seriousness of the charges), with the dissenting opinion in Halter (statutory maximum controls). Given the
use of statutory maximum as the gauge for Apprendi error, as
well as for entitlement to jury trial, we respectfully disagree
with the Halter majority decision.
s' See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)
(establishing two.part standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel - defendant must show that
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different); Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (if a defendant challenges representation
in connection with a guilty plea, he must show that "there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial").
52 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
5 See note 8, supra. In the period between the announcement
of the Jones and the Court's decision in Apprendi, however,
the failure to raise this argument could arguably fall below
professional standards.
, Your coauthors disagree with each other about the probable
resolution of this double jeopardy issue. One believes that
once a defendant has been tried on a nested offense, and
succeeds in raising an Apprendi challenge to his enhanced
sentence, he may not be retried on the higher offense on
remand, because the jury convicted him of the lesser
offense, and by attacking his sentence he does not seek to
vacate this conviction. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161
(1977) (conviction on lesser offense of joyriding bars trial on
greater offense of auto theft). The other maintains that
retrial on the higher offense may be permissible, because the
error is essentially an error in jury instructions which does
not bar retrial after a successful appeal.
For cases ordering resentencing, see, e.g., cases collected
in note 24, supra; and notes 56-61, infra. See also United
States v. Brown, 202 E3d 691, 703-04 (4th Cir. 2000)
(Richardson error not harmless, vacating CCE conviction and
sentence, but affirming conviction and sentence for other
charges); United States v. Mack, 201 F3d 1312, 1312-13
(1 1th Cir. 2000) (vacating Continuing Criminal Enterprise
conviction for Richardson error, but remanding for sentencing
on conviction of lesser offense). Two Circuits have vacated a
sentence and offered the district court the choice of retrying
the defendant on the vacated count or resentencing at the
lowest statutory drug amount. United States v. Von Meshack,
225 F3d 556 n.20 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lewis,
2000 WL 1390065 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished).
5 See also Edwards v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1475, 1477
(1999) (enhanced sentence under the relevant conduct provision of the federal sentencing guidelines for crack did not
exceed "the maximum that the statutes permit for a cocaineonly conspiracy").
220 F3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000) (the indictment charged, and
the jury was instructed upon, the type of drug but not the
quantity).
5' Defendant received a two-level enhancement for possession
of a gun during his drug-dealing activity, and a one-level
downward departure because he faced immediate deportation upon completion of his sentence. His offense level of 37,
combined with his criminal history category of 2, allowed a
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sentencing range of 235 to 293 months' imprisonment.
5 See Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D11, p. 100
(West 1998-99).
The judge is also bound by the statutory minimum sentence
for the amount of drugs that he determines defendant possessed Thus, the district judge was compelled to sentence
Aguayo-Delgado to at least 240 months, despite the lower
sentence of 235 months available under the Guidelines.
Apprendi did not overturn McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79 (1986), which permits a judge to impose a mandatory
minimum sentence (with the statutory maximum) based
upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence.
6 See, for example, United States v. Murphy, 109 F Supp. 2d
1059 (D. Minn. 2000) (reducing a defendant's sentence from
300 to 240 months based upon Apprendi error); United States
v. Nordby, 225 F 3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (vacating 10 year
sentence and remanding for sentence not to exceed five
years' imprisonment).
61 See United States v. Henderson, 105 E Supp. 2d 523 n.13
(S.D. W. Va. 2000) (noting possible sentence reduction to one
year under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4) for defendants who distribute marijuana, but finding that section inapplicable to the
case at bar as the indictment charged conspiracy to distribute both methamphetamine and marijuana).
62 However, a prosecutor who adds a recidivism enhancement
after defendant successfully appeals his sentence may face a
claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness. See North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (trial judge's imposition of
higher sentence after defendant's appeal and reconviction
raises question of vindictiveness).
63 See e.g., State v. Baker, 8 R3d 817 (Mont. 2000) (Leaphart,
J., concurring) (finding that MCA § 45-5-502(3), which
increases penalty for sexual assault from maximum of 6
months to maximum of 100 years based upon fact that victim was less than 16 years old and offender is three or more
years older than victim, is an element of the offense, but
affirming verdict and sentence on ground that substantial
and credible evidence presented to the jury established the
element); State v. Velasco, 253 Conn. 210, 751 A.2d 800,
814 (2000) (following Neder, vacating enhanced sentence for
use of a firearm as evidence was neither uncontested nor
overwhelming); State v. Benavides, 979 R2d 234, 242 (N.M.
App. 1998) (following Johnson, but vacating perjury conviction because the defendant properly objected to the trial
court's failure to submit materiality to the jury). But see State
v. Greene, 623 A.2d 1342, 1345 (N.H. 1993) (reversing and
remanding, when instructions omitted the requirement that
the jury's finding that the defendant committed the predicate
offense must be unanimous, because such an error "can
never be harmless"); Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 464
S.E.2d 198 (1995) (indictment that fails to either track statutory language or allege every element of the crime charged is
fatally defective, even after guilty plea).
See, e.g., People v. Buchholz, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 46 (Cal. App.
5 Dist. 1998) (limiting Johnson to federal cases, holding failure to instruct on element was reversible error per se despite
defendant's failure to object). See also People v. Duncan, 610
N.W.2d 551 (Mich. 2000) (refusing to apply Neder's harmless
error analysis where judge failed to instruct regarding any elements of felony-firearm offense, though facts were included in
murder allegation and jury verdict form included the offense);
Cooper v. People, 973 R2d 1234 (Colo. 1999) (failure to
instruct jury on element of burglary was structural error).
65 See, e.g., Parker v. Oklahoma, 917 R2d 980 (Ok.Cr.App. 1996)
(holding that because constitution protects only notice, an
information that alleges sufficient facts such that a person
can prepare his defense does not violate due process, even
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where the information does not allege each element of the
crime); State v. Kjorsvik, 812 R2d 86, 92 (Wash. 1991) (en
banc) (holding that charging document challenged for first
time after verdict is to be more liberally construed in favor of
validity, and defendant must show actual prejudice by establishing that he received no actual notice of the charges from
either the charging document itself or from "other circumstances of the charging process").
See, e.g., State v. Childs, 724 N.E.2d 781, 786 (Ohio 2000)
(affirming appellate court reversal of conviction, following
plea of no contest, on count of conspiracy, on the grounds
that "the state's failure to allege a specific, substantial, overt
act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy . . . rendered
the indictment invalid"); Jefferson v. State, 556 So. 2d 1016,
1019 (Miss. 1989) (stating that "the failure of the indictment
to charge a criminal offense or, more specifically, to charge
an essential element of a criminal offense, is not waived" by
a guilty plea); Cook v. State, 902 S.W. 2d 471, 480 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995) (declaring conviction void because the indictment
failed to charge "a person," and thus "did not vest the trial
court with jurisdiction"). However, in some states, the issue
of omitting an element from the indictment must be raised
prior to trial. See, e.g., Sawyer v. State, 938 S.W.3d 843, 845
(Ark. 1997) (denying habeas corpus petition, in part on
grounds that petitioner did not object to omission of element
from indictment prior to trial).
67 In states that follow Teague's retroactivity doctrine for their
own post-conviction review, relief may be blocked. Cf State v.
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Purnell, 735 A.2d 513, 523 (N.J. 1999) (rejecting retroactive
application of decision classifying materiality as element
under the state's version of Teague, reasoning that if
instructing the jury on materiality were fundamental enough
to qualify for an exception to the rule against retroactive
application of new rules, then Neder and Johnson would have
been decided differently).
8 Those state prisoners who failed to raise the issue in state
court will have to show cause for and prejudice from that failure, or actual innocence, as discussed in the text at notes
45- 50 supra.
69 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. Ill).

See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1499, 1512 (2000)
(interpreting § 2245(d)).
71

Id.

71 Cf. State v. Atwood, 16 S.W.3d 192, 196-97 (Tex. Ct. App.

2000) (because the State had not proven alI elements necessary for a felony conviction, in particular the fact of prior
convictions, the appellate court reduced the sentence from a
felony to a misdemeanor); State v. Tofoya, 91 Haw. 261, 982
P2d 890 (1999) (following Jones and remanding for resentencing to unenhanced penalty because element was not
proven to jury).
71 For example, distributing 400 grams or more of cocaine in

Texas yields a possible 99 year sentence, whereas the statutory ceiling for distributing any amount of cocaine is only 2
years. TEXAS HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.112 (West 2000).
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